A Fortune Divided

A CHF 1bn family office looks to hand power to four heirs who don't want the same thing

11/02/26

In the early 2000s, Jens Biersoss founded, scaled and sold an internet company, creating significant wealth in the process. Shortly after, he established Eagle Eye Capital AG ("EEC"), a single-family office to manage the estate, today worth approximately CHF 1bn.

For most of the next two decades, the mandate was straightforward: manage the portfolio with a long-term investment horizon. EEC took on an endowment style model of investing, adding alternatives like private equity and venture capital to traditional stocks and bonds. Today, the portfolio is broadly allocated as follows:

Public equity - 30%
Private equity - 30%
Direct real estate - 15%
Fixed income - 15%
Cash - 10%

Now, Jens is preparing to transfer the family wealth to the next generation. His four children have different plans:

The two eldest want to remain invested through the family office and broadly continue the existing strategy
The third needs CHF 20m of liquidity following a major life event
The youngest wants CHF 100m carved out to manage separately and independently

Background

  
    
        
        Today
        
        Tomorrow
        Amount to sell
      

        
        CHF m
        %
        
        CHF m
        %
        CHF m
      

    
        Public equity
        300
        30%
        No selling

        300
        34%
        0
      

        Private equity
        300
        30%
        Sell as needed

        218
        25%
        82
      

        Direct real estate
        150
        15%
        Sell 8M

        142
        16%
        8
      

        Fixed income
        150
        15%
        Keep at 15%

        132
        15%
        18
      

        Cash
        100
        10%
        Keep at 10%

        88
        10%
        12
      

        Total
        1,000
        100%
        Sell 120M

        880
        100%
        120
      

  

	Today		Tomorrow	Amount to sell
Public equity	300	30%	No selling	300	34%	0
Private equity	300	30%	Sell as needed	218	25%	82
Direct real estate	150	15%	Sell 8M	142	16%	8
Fixed income	150	15%	Keep at 15%	132	15%	18
Cash	100	10%	Keep at 10%	88	10%	12
Total	1,000	100%	Sell 120M	880	100%	120

EEC needs to create CHF 120m of liquidity (and hence reduce overall AUM to CHF 880M) on relatively short notice.

After assessing the options, the family agrees on a few key points:

Given current macro conditions, cash and fixed income must remain at 10% and 15% respectively. This means the max they can sell here is (10%+15%)*(1bn - 880m) = CHF 30m.
No selling any public equity. Given the market downturn, selling equities now means crystallising losses.
The only piece of real estate they will sell is Green Harbour, an idyllic New England mansion they rarely visit, but reckon they can sell for CHF 8m.

Problem

The takeaway is simple: CHF 82m needs to come from private equity.

EEC holds roughly CHF 300m across nine funds, a mix of well-known, mostly fully-funded buyout positions and smaller specialist growth and venture funds. They want to figure out:

How much is each position worth?
What to sell?

Given the years it took to build a reputation as a strong LP, EEC is also sensitive to not let word out that they are looking to sell.

EEC Private Equity Portfolio (CHF m)

    
        Fund name
        Vintage
        Total committed
        Total funded
        Total unfunded
        % unfunded
        Cost
        NAV
      

    
        Buyout VII
        2018
        60
        50
        10
        17%
        50
        75
      

        Buyout X
        2023
        65
        50
        15
        23%
        50
        48
      

        Buyout VI
        2017
        50
        50
        –
        0%
        50
        80
      

        Buyout VIII
        2020
        50
        50
        –
        0%
        50
        65
      

        Growth II
        2020
        25
        15
        10
        40%
        15
        14
      

        Growth I
        2021
        20
        20
        –
        0%
        20
        20
      

        Venture II
        2022
        15
        10
        5
        33%
        10
        8
      

        Venture III
        2021
        15
        10
        5
        33%
        10
        9
      

        Venture I
        2021
        15
        5
        10
        67%
        5
        4
      

  

Fund name	Vintage	Total committed	Total funded	Total unfunded	% unfunded	Cost	NAV
Buyout VII	2018	60	50	10	17%	50	75
Buyout X	2023	65	50	15	23%	50	48
Buyout VI	2017	50	50	–	0%	50	80
Buyout VIII	2020	50	50	–	0%	50	65
Growth II	2020	25	15	10	40%	15	14
Growth I	2021	20	20	–	0%	20	20
Venture II	2022	15	10	5	33%	10	8
Venture III	2021	15	10	5	33%	10	9
Venture I	2021	15	5	10	67%	5	4

EEC Private Equity Portfolio: Preliminary Pricing (CHF m)

        Fund name
        Vintage
        NAV
        
        Expected discount %
        Expected sell price
      
        Buyout VII
        2018
        75
        
        8%
        69
      
        Buyout X
        2023
        48
        
        6%
        45
      
        Buyout VI
        2017
        80
        
        7%
        74
      
        Buyout VIII
        2020
        65
        
        9%
        59
      
        Growth II
        2020
        14
        
        19%
        11
      
        Growth I
        2021
        20
        
        23%
        15
      
        Venture II
        2022
        8
        
        34%
        5
      
        Venture III
        2021
        9
        
        48%
        5
      
        Venture I
        2021
        4
        
        42%
        2

Fund name	Vintage	NAV	Expected discount %	Expected sell price
Buyout VII	2018	75	8%	69
Buyout X	2023	48	6%	45
Buyout VI	2017	80	7%	74
Buyout VIII	2020	65	9%	59
Growth II	2020	14	19%	11
Growth I	2021	20	23%	15
Venture II	2022	8	34%	5
Venture III	2021	9	48%	5
Venture I	2021	4	42%	2

Joran first provides preliminary pricing on the portfolio by conducting internal analysis and discreetly talking to 3 select buyers. The initial findings are below:

Solution

Based on the initial excercise, Joran lays out a few options:

Sell the mature buyout positions: Likely to draw broad institutional demand and price efficiently, but at the cost of potentially giving up valuable GP relationships
Sell the specialist portfolio: The 2021-22 growth and venture funds are less central to the future strategy, selling them simplifies the book. However, they will sell at wider discounts and won’t raise CHF 82m on their own.
Combine the two and sell a bundle: Package 1-2 “core” assets, and bundle with a few supplmentary assets to get over the CHF 82M mark.

It suggests that a combination is the best solution, and EEC signs off on the approach.

Joran proposes a 5-fund bundle: Venture I, Venture II, Venture III and Growth II, supplemented by Buyout VIII to anchor the deal and close the remaining gap. Buyout VI and Buyout VII, the oldest and best-performing positions in the portfolio, stay untouched.

Joran runs a discreet process with a shortlist of institutional secondary buyers, testing the bundle and comparing offers on price, certainty and speed of execution. Non-binding offers come in within a few weeks; the strongest are taken to advanced diligence, at which point GP consents are secured and EEC's identity is disclosed to the counterparties.

Two credible bids remain:

CHF 84m from a public bank, conditional on raising third-party capital and SPV around the deal
CHF 82m from a secondary fund, fully paid upfront

EEC takes the lower, fully-committed offer, preferring certainty of close.

Outcome

EEC raises CHF 120m by selling CHF 18m from fixed income, CHF 12m from cash and equivalents, CHF 8m from real estate, and CHF 82m from private equity. It avoids any dispute amongst family, and reshapes the portfolio for the next generation.

Disclaimer: This case study is for illustrative purposes only and does not constitute financial, legal, or tax advice. It is a hypothetical, simplified scenario intended to demonstrate how a secondary market transaction might be structured, and does not represent an actual client, transaction, or investment recommendation. The organizations, individuals, and figures depicted are fictional; any resemblance to real entities or persons is coincidental. Nothing in this case study should be relied upon in making an investment decision.